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ABSTRACT
In this paper we investigate the Dark Net which is the part of Internet accessible only via
special browsers such as Tor. The Dark Net is the home of black-markets for illegal goods and
services such as drugs, weapons and fake identities. In this study we investigate the Dark Net as
a digital infrastructure over time to address the following research question: what are the forces
underlying Dark Net markets? Our empirical approach is based on a set of techniques for
accessing Dark Net marketplaces (DNM) and collecting various types of information on sites,
transactions and users. We draw also on secondary sources such as reports of police
interventions and interviews. Our analysis follows the tradition of critical realism to shed light on
the generative mechanisms enabling Dark Net markets to operate and survive.
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INTRODUCTION
The illegal black markets that exist in the Dark Net can be considered the evil Mr. Hydes
of the Internet, the ugly market of illegal drugs, guns, child porn and stolen documents. It is the
place where the innovative power of technology is used for illegal and unethical purposes, and
certainly is a place that most of us would not want to visit. It is a place that most of us prefer to
ignore. In this paper, we argue that this disregard is unfortunate for two reasons. First, the Dark
Net is a fact of the digital world, and increasing one. As Bartlett (2014) describes, the Dark Net
is a strange mixture of crime and idealism, including both dissident sites, drug markets, terrorism
and many things between, and should be researched as a global phenomenon.
Second, the criminal part of the Dark Net, fueled by cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin, is a
real and serious threat (Europol 2017), and we need knowledge about it in order to mitigate the
risks generated by its users (Kethineni et al. 2017; Samtani et al. 2017). Recent studies show how
the Dark Net is contributing to the rise of new forms of crime by providing platforms supporting
criminal interactions (Spagnoletti et al. 2018). Dark Net Marketplaces (DNMs) are facilitating
illicit trade in hacking services (e.g. renting a Botnet or a Thingbot), fake identity documents and
stolen information (Odabas et al. 2017) useful to conduct online fraud through spear phishing
and advanced persistent threats (Chaudhry 2017; Hurlburt 2017; Kraemer-Mbula et al. 2013;
Samani 2016).
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DNMs - described also as cryptomarkets or black-markets - are e-commerce platforms
supporting interactions between the buyers and sellers of illegal goods. Therefore, DNMs
combine Dark Net capabilities for anonymous surfing with traditional e-commerce functions.
Moreover, to conceal payments and money laundering cryptocurrencies are often used in DNMs.
Specialized law enforcement agencies (LEA) units survey and occasionally raid these web sites,
an example being when the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) closed the Silk Road site
in 2013 (Soska and Christin 2015). Despite growing international cooperation among private and
public institutions, attribution is hard for LEAs given the anonymity of interactions. DNMs
enable new forms of crime that take advantage of digital capabilities, anonymity and online
collaboration and are difficult to fight by focusing only on observable events. The situation calls
for an interdisciplinary and multi-level reconceptualization of Dark Net infrastructures. This
effort should be accompanied by critical analysis and the exploratory power of social science to
stimulate sense-making processes and make decision-making more effective.
We conceptualize Dark Nets as digital infrastructures where anonymity is a necessary
condition for the active engagement of participants in online interactions. In digital
infrastructures heterogeneous and autonomous human or organizational actors use information
technology to allow adaptation to each other and their external environments (Hanseth and
Lyytinen 2010; Henfridsson and Bygstad 2013). However, the anonymity of the technological
and human components in Dark Nets can make this adaptation processes problematic and have a
negative impact on infrastructure functioning. Our research questions are: how are digital

Proceedings of the 13th Pre-ICIS Workshop on Information Security and Privacy, San
Francisco, December 13, 2018.

3

Spagnoletti et al.

The generative mechanisms of dark net markets

infrastructures generated under conditions of anonymity? What are the underlying mechanisms
that explain the functioning of the Dark Net infrastructure?
In this study, we approach the Dark Net from both an empirical and a theoretical view.
Empirically, we triangulate archival data from secondary sources with primary data obtained
from interviews with LEA agents. We access the Dark Net using specially designed software that
allows collection of substantial amounts of information on sites, anonymous actors,
communications and transactions. Theoretically, we conduct an in-depth critical realist analysis
which reveals the underlying forces shaping the evolution of the Dark Net infrastructure. We
identify three generative mechanisms, i.e. Cybercrime scaling, Black platformization, Dark Net
resilience.
These causal structures explain how cybercrime is fueled by illegal trading, hacking and
collective recovery within regular market operations and breakdowns. Compared to other
empirical contexts, breakdown events are more frequent in the Dark Net, and therefore are easier
to observe. This allows a deeper understanding of the innovation dynamics occurring within
digital infrastructures. Moreover, we shed light on the governance of global information
infrastructures, identifying how interactions among multiple actors with different roles (hackers,
criminal communities, LEAs agents, buyers and vendors) shape the functionalities and
characteristics of the Dark Net infrastructure.
THEORETICAL LENS: DARK NET AS DIGITAL INFRASTRUCTURE
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The term digital infrastructure2 encompasses a socio-technical interconnected structure of
systems, people and organizations. Examples include Internet, financial systems, Facebook and
airline booking systems. The extant literature on digital infrastructures studies the phenomenon
in several contexts such as Internet development (Hanseth and Lyytinen 2010), scientific
infrastructures (Edwards et al. 2013), the evolution of mobile platforms (Eaton et al. 2015) and
commercial developments.
Digital infrastructures can be considered as an organizational phenomenon; they include
both technical solutions and also the organizations and people that leverage the services. They
also include the development and knowledge communities that produce the solutions and the
support functions. Many infrastructures include several million people, organized in digital
ecosystems. The literature highlights some key attributes: (i) digital infrastructures are different
from traditional information systems; they are heterogeneous, often with no dominant actor
(Hanseth and Lyytinen 2010); (ii) the dynamics of digital infrastructures are different; they are
not designed but evolve through innovation, adoption and scaling (Henfridsson and Bygstad
2013). Therefore, digital infrastructures are comprised of computing and network resources
which allow multiple stakeholders to orchestrate their service and content needs by exploiting
the externalities of digital platforms (Constantinides et al. 2018).

2

Also called information infrastructures or cyberinfrastructures
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In this paper we adopt a broad definition of Dark Net, intended as the portion of the
Internet providing digital capabilities to clandestine groups that design, implement and maintain
its functionality. There are few studies of the Dark Net that adopt this perspective but there is a
line of organizational research on terrorist and drug organizations. For instance, Milward and
Raab (2006) found that resilient dark networks manage to rebalance differentiation and
integration mechanisms in their internal structure and adjust to the new requirements. Therefore,
they are difficult to break. What is less well known is how the interplay among the digital and
social elements produces the observed outcomes. It is reasonable to expect that some
mechanisms operating in traditional and legal digital infrastructures will work also in the Dark
Net. However, it is expected also that due to its particular technical and social structures, other
and quite different mechanisms will exist. Our methodological approach is designed to reveal
these.
METHOD: DATA COLLECTION AND DATA ANALYSIS
We take a critical realist case study approach (Bhaskar 1998; Mingers 2004; Wynn and
Williams 2012) which requires comprehensive data collection, and in-depth data analysis,
deploying retroduction to uncover causal mechanisms. We are looking not for regularities at the
level of events but deeper level contingent (and generalizable) mechanisms operating on social
and technical structures.
The empirical context of our study is the ecosystem of the DNMs. We collected data
from multiple sources: the characteristics of anonymity and secrecy of the markets and users
analyzed make use of data triangulation and mixed methods especially important since no single
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source can provide a complete picture of the phenomenon (Ferguson 2017). We collected data
referring to the period 2009 to 2018, covering 10 years. The aim of our data collection was to
obtain a full understanding of events, products, actors, processes and technologies occurring in a
specific class of fraudulent practice: illegal trade in credit card information.
Data were collected by a combination of crawling the Dark Net and analyzing open
sources on the surface web. Table 1 presents an overview of our data collection strategies.
We conducted a critical realist analysis aimed at uncovering the deeper causal structure
explaining the empirical observations (Bhaskar 1998; Sayer 1994). We used the technique called
retroduction (Wynn and Williams 2012). We built on the method described in Bygstad and
Munkvold (2011) (Table 2 presents the process). We started by identifying key events. We
define events as clusters of observations. Some events such as the establishment of Dark Net
sites (Silk Road, BMR, Agora) and police interventions were obtained from secondary sources,
others emerged from the data. These included sites’ offerings and the interactions among actors.
Next we identified key components (assumed structural objects) of the case such as the Dark Net
actors, the technologies and the users, and also the law enforcement actors.
To assess the material collected, we conducted a theoretical re-description of our research
object conceptualizing it as a digital infrastructure. This allowed a deeper analysis in the next
step of retroduction in which retroduction of candidate mechanisms is crucial. Following
Hedström and Swedberg (1996), we looked for three types of mechanisms: how structure
influences action (macro-to-micro), how action triggers action (micro-to-micro), and how action
reproduces or changes structure (micro-to-macro).
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Overview of data collection strategies

Category

Aim

Data source

Data collection method

Data collected

Events

Evolution of the
Dark Net

Identifying and counting
activities per month

Evolution of 122
marketplaces in the
deep web.

Products

Description of the
illegal trade of
financial
documents and
fake IDs
Vendors, Buyers,
Administrators
and LEAs

Open web:
Way back machine,
Deepdotweb.com,
Darkwebnews.com
Six Tor marketplaces:
AlphaBay, Dream Market, Hansa,
Leo, Outlaw and Bloomfield

Crawling the web site and
extracting information by
the use of the Scrapy tool

A dataset of 36 GB:
AlphaBay (9120
offers), Dream Market
(18506 offers), Hansa
(13068)
A dataset of PGP
keys of vendors and
buyers
Process and
operations by LEA

Actors

Processes

Understanding of
security measures

a) Deep web: Five Tor
marketplaces: Alphabay, Dream,
Hansa, Outlaw, Valhalla
b) Police reports
c) Interviews with LEA operators
a) Deep web: DNMs
b) Open web:
Deepdotweb.com and
Darkwebnews.com

Crawling the web site and
extracting information by
the use of the Scrapy tool
Gathering of information on
police operations
Identification of relevant
technologies and security
mechanism

Evolution of security
functions
implemented in DNM
platforms

FINDINGS
In this short paper, we provide an overview of the evolution of DNMs in the past five
years and discuss the mechanisms that explain the complex interactions among law enforcement,
buyers and vendors of illegal goods and DNM platforms. We conduct an in depth analysis of the
market for stolen data (e.g. credit card information) in which hackers - thieves sell information
retrieved and services designed to acquire data and system-level access (Odabas et al. 2017). For
space reasons, we provide only a short overview of the three mechanisms.
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Figure 1. The establishment and termination of DNMs
Figure 1 provides a fine grained depiction of the evolution of the DNMs. Our analysis
identifies development between October 2013 and April 2018 and the number of active sites, and
indicates some key events. The first Dark Net site of which there was some public awareness,
Silk Road, was closed down by the FBI in November 2013. At that point, there were 6 active
sites; this number had increased to more than 25 by summer 2014. The Onymous operation in
October 2014 resulted in some of these sites being closed down. In April 2015, the Evolution site
was closed down by the site administrators who pocketed the funds. However, in the months
following the number of active sites increased. After a period of relative stability involving more
than 20 active sites, in July 2017 Operation Bayonet reduced this number to 5. At the time of
writing (October 2018), the number of DNM sites actives is still low (8).
Through systematic retroduction we identified three high-level Dark Net mechanisms.
Retroduction is a technique that looks for regularities not at the level of events but at the level of
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causal mechanisms (Sayer 1994; Wynn and Williams 2012). These mechanisms operate on the
structural elements and lead to observable events. Figure 2 provides a schematic illustration.

Figure 2. Events, mechanisms and structure
Mechanism 1: Cybercrime scaling
The structure of a DNM is quite similar to the structure of any other two-sided platform,
and enables vendors and buyers to trade at low transaction costs (Parker and Van Alstyne 2005).
Similar to traditional e-commerce platforms such as Amazon and eBay, DNM buyers can be
victims of different forms of deception such as non-delivery of items, product inauthenticity,
misrepresentation and shill bidding (Grazioli and Jarvenpaa 2000, 2003; Yar 2016). This risk is
accentuated in DNMs given the lack of transparency and the impossibility to recur to trusted
third parties in the case of disputes.
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However, our evidence on the evolution of DNMs (Fig. 1) shows that despite police
interventions and exit scams, black-markets are flourishing and supporting buyers and vendors to
trade illegal goods successfully online. How can buyer, vendor and platform owner trust one
another? The volume of transactions handled by DNMs shows that it is relatively easy for a
buyer to browse the offerings, select an object, purchase it anonymously and rate the vendor.
Therefore, vendors can build reputation by providing additional services and information to
guarantee the quality of the purchase. Examples include the functions for checking the validity of
stolen credit cards and the refunding policies issued by vendors. On the side of platform owners,
advanced trust functions such as escrow and PGP (Pretty Good Privacy) multisignature are
implemented in DNMs to prevent deception.
DNMs subsequent to Silk Road offer a larger variety of products and services such as
credit card holograms, dumps, tools and guidelines for stealing and using stolen credit cards.
These platforms activate network externalities by attracting new buyers and vendors and
generating a cybercrime infrastructure. We describe this self-reinforcing mechanism as
“cybercrime scaling”. We define cybercrime scaling as a process where a Cybercrime
infrastructure enables vendors to build reputation, and successful purchases attract a critical
mass of users to trade a greater variety of products and services.
Mechanism 2: Black platformization
The second mechanism identified is called black platformization. We observed above that
the Dark Net infrastructure is a powerful resource for establishing a market in both stolen data
and hacking tools. For instance, hackers can develop and sell new versions of malware and
Proceedings of the 13th Pre-ICIS Workshop on Information Security and Privacy, San 11
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provide instructions to deceivers using secure communication channels. Sets of personal data are
sold to deceivers who conduct personalized phishing campaigns to perform large scale fraud
using cryptocurrencies to collect payments and enable money laundering.
Marketplace administrators constantly monitor the fast-evolving landscape of digital
solutions and adapt their platforms by integrating functions to satisfy their users. Some blackmarkets specialize in serving a particular community, others serve different purposes. Therefore,
DNMs can be conceptualized as digital platforms (Constantinides et al. 2018) enriched with new
capabilities to follow the emerging needs of criminal communities. The Dark Net infrastructure
consists of a combination of buyers, vendors and law enforcement agents adopting and
innovating digital tools for anonymous interactions. The use of a virtual private network (VPN)
to connect to the Tor network and install a new instance of a DNM (e.g. Silk Road 2) is an
example of such interaction. We use the term platformization to emphasize the dynamic and
volatile character of the innovation process taking place in the Dark Net infrastructure.
Black platformization is driven by the urgency to react to the new means adopted by
LEAs in identifying online trade of illegal goods. Such crowd-based innovation exploits the
potential of hacker communities whose cooperation is supported heavily by digital platforms
(Samtani et al. 2017; Spagnoletti et al. 2015). For instance, payments methods for illegal goods
changed from centralized services offered by actors in non-collaborating countries (e.g. Liberty
Reserve in Costa Rica between 2006 and 2013) to decentralized systems based on blockchain
technology (e.g. Bitcoin), to more recent tumbling tools for cryptocurrencies. These architectural
changes were triggered by increased cooperation among LEAs (Hui et al. 2017) and
Proceedings of the 13th Pre-ICIS Workshop on Information Security and Privacy, San 12
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advancements in attribution methods and tools (i.e. “follow the money” practices). We define
black platformization as a process where the Dark Net infrastructure enables criminals to sell
new digital products and DNM’ administrators enhance the security and efficiency of
transactions by implementing new features crowdsourced from hackers and online communities.
Mechanism 3: Dark Net resilience
The specific characteristics of anonymous trade (i.e. anonymity, untraceability and
illegality of the goods exchanged) lead to sudden and frequent interruptions to normal
functioning. Such interruptions can be caused by sudden and unpredictable events such as an exit
scam or a police operation. In the first case, the deceivers exploit the opportunity created by the
presence in the escrow system of substantial amounts of money: the deceiver may simply
transfer the crypto-currency to his or her own account, and close down the site leaving no traces
of either vendors or buyers. In the case of police operations, LEAs seize sites and block the trade
of illegal goods.
There are observable consequences of those events. For instance, the number of DNMs
significantly reduces after documented police raids, while the Sheep Market and Evolution exit
scams provoked reactions from the communities of users. In the Sheep Market case, users
coordinated to collectively discover and disclose the identity of the deceiver. In the Evolution
case, there was an increase in the number of active sites (see Fig. 1). After a period of “collective
recovering” involving various different actions, we observe changes to both the process and
technologies of the Dark Net. For instance, after an exit scam, vendors move to more trusted
sites with enhanced security functionalities. Similarly, criminals react to the surveillance
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activities of the police and experiment with new attack schemas based on the adoption of
advanced tools such as peer-to-peer markets and payment systems, and encrypted point to point
channels for communication (e.g. Tor on VPN).
We define Dark Net resilience as a process where the Dark Net infrastructure enables
successful and unpredictable actions by deceivers and LEAs to cause a breakdown in normal
market operations that leads to a collective recovery among the user community determining the
morphing of technological and fraudulent schemas.
Table 2 presents a summary of the mechanisms and their link to the empirical data .
Table 2. Outcome of retroduction (adapted from Wynn and Williams (2012))
Mechanism
Cybercrime
scaling

Black
platformization

Dark Net
resilience

Definition
Cybercrime infrastructure enables
vendors to build their reputation
and successful purchases attract a
critical mass of users to trade a
greater variety of products and
services
Dark Net infrastructure enables
criminals to sell new digital
products and DNMs’ admins
enhance the security and
efficiency of transactions by
implementing new features
crowdsourced from hackers and
online communities
Dark Net infrastructure enables
successful and unpredictable
actions of deceivers and LEAs to
cause a breakdown in the normal
market operation that leads to a
collective recovery action by the
user community determining the
morphing of technological and
fraudulent schema.

Key events
Trusted credit card vendor
Carder.su forum and card
checking systems
Liberty Reserve and Bitcoin
Carding offerings in DNMs

Data sources
Newspapers, court
documents, police
reports, blogs, Gwern
Alphabay scraping

Malware and ransomware
Dataset of personal data
Escrow and private messages
Multisignature, Finalize Early
and Forced PGP Vendor

Newspapers, police
reports, blogs,
websites, Gwern, IA

Sheep market and Evolution
exit scams
Peer to peer markets and
payments
LEAs cooperation to “Follow
the money”
Onymous and Bayonet
operations

Newspapers, blogs,
websites, IA,
interviews with LEA,
court documents,
police reports
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